Det pratas om att spara på naturresurser. Att vi ska spara el, att vi ska återvinna in absurdum. I barnprogrammen uppmanas ungarna till att b l a att spara på papper.Papper ja. Idag fick jag ett A4 stort kvitto på posten när jag köpt ett frimärke!
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4 kommentarer:
Rent rättsekonomiskt så är frimärkstransaktionen gynnande för samhällets välstånd och välfärd.
Du har lämnat över 5 kronor och 50 öre i utbyte för en "liten" och en "stor papperslapp".
Din betalningsvilja för frimärket måste förstås vara densamma som det
monopolistiska marknadspriset, för annars hade Du ju aldrig köpt ett frimärke.
Välståndet förutsätts sålunda ha ökat på posten baserat på antagandet att den lilla papperslappen
plus den stora papperslappen har ett mindre värde än det reservationspris som gällde
för posten och transaktionen.
Hade Din betalningsvilja för frimärket varit högre än marknadspriset,
så hade det i rättsekonomisk mening förelegat en kvasiränta,
varför transaktionen i det hänseendet varit paretoeffektiv då Ditt välstånd samtidigt ökat
i och med denna frivilliga transaktion. Dvs. Hade Du värdetar frimärket till 10,5 kr, så hade ditt välstånd ökat med 10,5kr-5,5kr.
I detta fallet så torde Kaldor Hicks kriteriet vara uppfyllt med avseende på välståndet. Men det är inte säkert att det heller är sant.
En definition på kaldor Hicks lyder enligt följande:
"Det kompensatationstest som Kaldor [...] utvecklat förklarar X vara överlägset Y om och endast om vi från X genom omfördelningar kan nå ett tillstånd Z som är så att ZpY [ z föredras framför Y] enligt Pareto kriteriet, dvs. om vi går från tillståndet Y till tillståndet X så kan de som vinner på denna framgång kompensera dem som förlorar på den och ändå ha något av vinsten kvar".
Frimärkstransaktionen har minskat Ditt välstånd med 5,5 kr rent initialt, men välfärden
uttryckt i nyttoenheter har ökat, dvs Din egen välfärd av att skicka brevet har troligen ökat.
Du känner Dig förmodligen glad, frånsett dina negativa tankar om miljön att Du skickat ett brev.
Tänk även på den glade mottagaren av brevet. Dennes välfärd har med stor sannolikhet ökat,
eftersom ditt brev säkerligen skänkt glädje. Dennes nyttoenheter av att få brevet har sålunda
ökat.
VAd kan Du göra?
Bakgrund
1. Frimärket är förlorat eftersom Du klistrat detta på brevet.
2. Pengarna är borta.
3. Du har ett stort papper kvar.
Domslut
Försök att sälja det stora papperet eller lämna det till pappersinsamlingen.
Och kom ihåg till nästa gång ! Skicka inga mera brev, eftersom Du då skitar ner miljön !
// Mvh JJ
Är det lagakraftvunnet, eller går det att överklaga?
(samlar kraft)
Du kan ju begära återköp på posten, men detta förutsätter Då att frimärket inte är ivägskickat... Problemet då, är att Du med stor sannolikhet får ytterligare ett stort A4-papper som bevis på återköpet. Och då har Du 2 st A4:or... Gör man detta 1 miljon gånger, så har man två miljoner A4 papper. (Hur många ton blir detta tro, och vad kan kilo priset vara på papper?)... Avslutningsvis, så går det inte att överklaga ! // Mvh JJ :) PS har lite tid över (tar paus) och går faktiskt igenom dina skrifter på bloggen. Bra ds
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
Pareto improvements are a small subset of Kaldor-Hicks improvements.Kaldor-Hicks efficiency (named for Nicholas Kaldor and John Hicks) is a type of economic efficiency that captures some of the intuitive appeal of Pareto efficiency, while having less stringent criteria and therefore being applicable in more circumstances.
Under Pareto efficiency, an outcome is more efficient if at least one person is made better off and nobody is made worse off. This seems a reasonable way to determine whether an outcome is efficient or not. However, some believe that in practice it is almost impossible to make any large change such as an economic policy change without making at least one person worse off. Under ideal conditions, exchanges are Pareto efficient since individuals would not voluntarily entered into them unless they were mutually beneficial. (Not all exchanges are Pareto superior: an exchange would not be superior if external costs exist, as they often do. If the voluntary exchange led to negative externalities such as pollution that hurt a third party, it would not be Pareto superior.)
Using Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, an outcome is more efficient if those that are made better off could in theory compensate those that are made worse off and lead to a Pareto optimal outcome. Thus, a more efficient outcome can in fact leave some people worse off.
The key difference is the question of compensation. Kaldor-Hicks does not require compensation actually be paid, merely that the possibility for compensation exists, and thus does not necessarily make each party better off (or neutral). Pareto efficiency does require making each party better off (or at least no worse off).
While every Pareto improvement is a Kaldor-Hicks improvement, most Kaldor-Hicks improvements are not Pareto improvements. This is because, as the graph above illustrates, the set of Pareto improvements is a subset of Kaldor-Hicks improvement, which also reflects the greater flexibility and applicability of the Kaldor-Hicks criteria relative to the Pareto criteria. For example, in a society with two people suppose initially Person A has 10$ and Person B 100$. Assume that some policy change or other shock results in a situation where Person A winds up with 20$ and Person B with 99$. This change is NOT Pareto improving since Person B is now worse off. But it does satisfy the Kaldor-Hicks criteria since Person A could theoretically pay Person B anywhere between 1 and 20 dollars to accept this alternative situation.
The Kaldor and Hicks methods are typically used as tests of Pareto efficiency rather than efficiency goals themselves. They are used to determine whether an activity is moving the economy towards Pareto efficiency. Any change usually makes some people better off while making others worse off, so these tests ask what would happen if the winners were to compensate the losers.
Using the Kaldor criterion an activity will contribute to Pareto optimality if the maximum amount the gainers are prepared to pay is greater than the minimum amount that the losers are prepared to accept.
Under the Hicks criterion, an activity will contribute to Pareto optimality if the maximum amount the losers are prepared to offer to the gainers in order to prevent the change is less than the minimum amount the gainers are prepared to accept as a bribe to forgo the change. The Hicks compensation test is from the losers' point of view, while the Kaldor compensation test is from the gainers' point of view. After several technical problems with each separate criterion were discovered, they were combined into the Scitovsky criterion, more commonly known as the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, which does not share the same flaws.
The Kaldor-Hicks criterion is widely applied in welfare economics and managerial economics. For example, it forms an underlying rationale for cost-benefit analysis. In cost-benefit analysis, a project (for example, a new airport) is evaluated by comparing the total costs, such as building costs and environmental costs, with the total benefits, such as airline profits and convenience for travelers. (However, as cost-benefit analysis may also assign different social welfare weights to different individuals, e.g. more to the poor, the compensation criterion is not always invoked by cost-benefit analysis.)
The project would typically be given the go-ahead if the benefits exceed the costs. This is effectively an application of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, because it is equivalent to requiring that the benefits should be enough that those that benefit could in theory compensate those that have lost out. The criterion is used because it is argued that it is justifiable for society as a whole to make some worse off if this means a greater gain for others.
Criticisms
The most common criticism of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is that it only takes into account the absolute level of income, but disregards its distribution.
A related problem is that any social welfare functions based on Kaldor-Hicks criteria are cardinal in nature, and therefore suffer from the aggregation problems associated with discrepancies between the marginal value of money of rich and poor people.
At a more technical level, various versions of the Kaldor-Hicks criteria lack desirable formal properties. For instance, Tibor Scitovsky demonstrated that the Kaldor criterion alone is not symmetric: it's possible to have a situation where an outcome A is an improvement (according to the Kaldor criterion) over outcome B, but B is also an improvement over A. The combined Kaldor-Hicks criterion does not have this problem, but it can be non-transitive (A may be an improvement over B, and B over C, but A may not be an improvement over C).[1]
Another problem with Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is that it only considers private property and private income but does not take into account change in value of the Commons, Natural Environment, and other Externalities.
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